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Abstract: Due to its ability to solve all main problems associated with digital goods, Digital 
Rights Management is the favourite option used by companies to tackle piracy. The aim of 
this article is to discuss the consequences of DRM for consumers, firms and society. The 
rationales of DRM are discussed and the expected benefits for firms are presented.. In 
contrast, consumers are shown to be likely to see few benefits in DRM. This article 
demonstrates that even a standard DRM system is unlikely to improve social welfare. The 
article concludes with some public policy recommendations. 
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he content industry is, especially since the appearance of the digital 
goods, one of the fast growing and innovative industries. However, 
the growth and viability of the companies in this industry are seriously 
undermined by the extent of consumer piracy, which seems to be, in addition 
to innovation, the main characteristic of this sector. One of the most common 
solutions to fight against piracy and enforce intellectual property rights is the 
introduction of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies. 
The purpose of Digital Rights Management is to help content creators 
protect the content from uncontrolled use and distribution. DRM systems 
work in such a way that any action of the consumer that is not explicitly 
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authorised by the producer is, by default, prevented. As such, these systems 
allow to prevent the copying, sharing, as well as the simultaneous use of 
digital goods. Furthermore, DRM systems make the anonymity of 
consumption impossible since they require a formal identification before 
protected digital goods can be consumed. Supporters of DRM believe that 
DRM can provide a secure distribution of digital content. As a side effect, 
DRM can allow the firms to gain some additional strategic advantages 
(switching costs, consumers lock-in, barriers to entry, absence of second-
hand market, collection of information on the consumers' behaviour) and can 
also help the firms appropriate extra revenues (DRM allows the firms to 
charge the consumers several times for the usage of the same digital goods 
at different locations e.g. home, work, car). 
The opponents argue that DRM is not very effective in preventing piracy, 
but can prevent the legitimate users taking full advantage of the digital 
media. The Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure notes that DRM 
can act as a trade barrier. There is also a view that DRM can prevent future 
historians from recovering the necessary data due to the variety of 
technology required to read the data. Finally, the DRM opponents state that 
DRM infringes private property rights and very often restricts user's activities. 
The other problem associated with the DRM is that, since there is no 
standard for DRM and no compatibility between the existing systems, it 
causes additional problems for the consumers, the firms and eventually for 
the society. 
The aim of this article is to discuss the consequences of DRM for 
consumers, firms and society. First, the rationales of DRM are detailed. This 
is followed by an analysis of the strategic advantages created by DRM and 
the possible limitations. The issue of the impact of DRM on consumers is 
then assessed. Finally, this article conducts an in-depth study of the 
consequences of DRM on social welfare and recommends some policy 
changes as well as some improvements of the DRM strategies of firms. 
  The rationales of Digital Right Management 
Digital goods are goods that are distributed in digital format (i.e. encoded 
in binary form, as a succession of 0s and 1s). Nowadays, most 
entertainment goods (such as music, movies, computer games and books) T. RAYNA & L. STRIUKOVA  111 
and also a large number of professional tools (software, documentation, 
stock pictures) are digital goods. 
Due to their digital nature, all these goods have a common characteristic: 
they are replicable. Indeed, digital goods can be copied without loss of 
quality or information. Therefore, a copy of a digital good is a perfect replica 
(a clone) of the original. As a consequence, digital goods are independent of 
the medium used to distribute and store them. More precisely, the binary 
form used for encoding them ensures that these goods can be transferred 
from one medium to another without loss of quality or information.  
The digital nature of digital goods has important consequences in regard 
to the economic characteristics of these goods. First of all, their replicability 
makes digital goods both public and durable. Secondly, the economic value 
of digital goods lies in the content embedded in these goods. As this content 
is either information, culture or entertainment, digital goods are experience 
goods. 
These three economic characteristics are expected to lead to important 
challenges for the firms that produce digital goods. First of all, the public 
nature of digital goods is likely to lead to a free-riding behaviour of 
consumers (RAMELLO, 2005). The inability of firms to exclude consumers 
leads to a wide piracy phenomenon and, thus, undermines their ability to 
make profits and recover the initial fixed cost of production. Moreover, digital 
goods have common characteristics with ideas, information and innovation. 
All these types of good are also known in the literature as leading to market 
failure because of their nature. The usual argument (ARROW, 1962; 
NORDHAUS, 1969; AGHION & HOWITT, 1992) is that, in the absence of a 
proper protection system, the market fails to produce a sufficient quantity of 
these goods. This is due to the fact that, since the replication cost for these 
goods is negligible, the marginal cost of such goods is equal to zero. 
Therefore, in a competitive environment, the price of these goods is 
expected to equal zero.  
Secondly, the potentially infinite durability of digital goods deprives firms 
from the large amount of revenues they used to enjoy because of the 
renewed purchase of consumers. Its important to note that sales are further 
decreased by the universality of digital technology and the perfect 
replicability: consumers are now able to use the same unit of digital good 
with various devices: Hi-Fi, computers, MP3 players, etc., whereas before 
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to obtain an optimal quality (e.g. consumers could have to purchase both a 
vinyl and an audio tape of the same album).  
Finally, the fact that digital goods are experience goods makes 
consumers reluctant to purchase these goods before they are able to 
experience them and determine their value. As a consequence, firms have 
to supply consumers with samples of the digital goods. If they do not do so, 
consumers may be encouraged to conduct their own sampling activity by 
pirating. In this case, they are very unlikely to be willing to pay for a 
legitimate version of the digital goods once the good has been experienced. 
However, providing consumers with samples is not always an easy option. 
Indeed, firms need to ensure that the consumers are only able to consume 
the sample a small number of times, as otherwise consumers will probably 
decide to not purchase the product. For some digital goods, it may be 
possible to offer, as a sample, a truncated/stripped down version of the 
digital good (as it is often the case with electronic books, films and software). 
Nevertheless, such a strategy may cause consumers to underestimate the 
value of the digital good, thereby reducing their willingness to pay. In 
addition, the value of some digital goods, such as music, is unlikely to be 
revealed by partial sampling, and may even require repeated experience.  
These three economic characteristics of digital goods raise a serious 
challenge for government and policy makers: without public intervention, the 
number of market failures and the resulting loss of social welfare are likely to 
be very high. The usual solution to this type of problems is the use of 
intellectual property rights, which can help to safeguard creator's award 
(MERGERS & NELSON, 1990). However, although IPRs may act as an 
efficient deterrent in the case of inventions, they do not have much effect in 
the case of digital goods, because of the massive scale of piracy 
phenomenon (RAYNA, 2006a). 
  Digital Right Management systems 
The purpose of Digital Rights Management is to help content creators 
protect their products from uncontrolled use and distribution. As opposed to 
enforcement of IPR, which occurs after the infringement (and is thus 
punitive) has occurred, DRM aims at preventing the infringement from 
initially taking place (and is thus preventive). The DRM protection is 
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good, which can therefore not be consumed without being decoded first. The 
DRM tags embedded in the file contain precise information about the owner 
of the file and the rights of usage this owner has. For example, in order to be 
played on a computer or on a media player, a music file protected by DRM 
has to be activated. The activation is made by contacting a central server on 
the internet. The consumer is then asked to identify herself, and this 
information is compared with the owner's information included in the file. If 
the authentication is confirmed, the computer receives a key allowing to 
decode, and play, the music file. In addition to the decoding key, data 
containing instructions about potential restrictions may be transmitted to the 
computer. Indeed, DRM systems allow to restrict the number of times the 
music file is activated, so that consumers cannot consume the same music 
file on more than one computer at the same time, it can also prevent the file 
from being copied/transferred, or exported, more than a certain number of 
times. 
The most popular (in terms of usage) DRM technology, at the time of this 
writing, is FairPlay which was created by Apple and is used by its products 
and services, such as iPod, iTunes and iTunes Store. The files protected by 
FairPlay can only be played on authorised computers and at most five 
computers may be authorised at the same time. Consumers can, however, 
burn their music files on CDs which will have legal, but not physical 
restrictions. Yet, a particular playlist can only be burnt up to seven times, 
though the overall number of burns is not limited. The main issue related to 
FairPlay is that, because of Apple's refusal to licence its technology, songs 
purchased from iTunes Store can only be played on Apple's iPod media 
player (although they play on any Windows or Mac computer) and the only 
DRM protected songs compatible with iPod are the ones purchased from the 
iTunes Store. Despite these limitations, this technology is the most used 
one, certainly owing to iPod's 80% market share in the market for portable 
media players. Since the introductions of films, video clips and TV 
programmes on the iTunes Store, FairPlay technology is also available to 
protect video content.  
Other DRM technologies are much less popular and are (by order of 
popularity): Microsoft's PlayForSure, RealNetworks' Helix, Sony's ATRAC. 
These three DRM systems are able to protect both audio and video files. 
These technologies allow to establish similar restriction as Apple's FairPlay.  
Both Microsoft and RealNetworks licence out their technologies. There 
are still, however, some restrictions. Microsoft PlayForSure only functions on 
Windows and RealNetworks Helix has to be used in conjunction with their 114     No. 69, 1
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Real's content distribution server. Like Apple, Sony has refused to licence 
out its ATTRAC technology and is, to this day, the sole user of this system. 
Microsoft recently adopted a similar approach, since they developed a new 
DRM technology (used by the new portable media player Microsoft Zune) 
that they have decided not to licence out. 
  Digital Right Management as universal solution? 
Although Digital Rights Management systems were primarily developed 
as a solution to piracy (and thus addressed the problem caused by the 
publicness of digital goods), these systems also provide a solution to the 
problems caused by durability and uncertain ex-ante value of digital goods. 
With regard to the publicness of digital goods, DRM enables to increase 
the excludability of digital goods, and thus to reduce (or eliminate) piracy. 
Since DRM protection requires an authentication for the digital good to be 
consumed, a consumer able to obtain a pirated copy of the good is unable to 
consume this digital good unless it is activated. Since the activation is 
granted by firms only, this means that DRM restores the excluding capability 
of firms. To this respect, BOMSEL & GEFFROY (2006) note that "[...] DRMs 
are intellectual property institutions [and] transpose the empirical principle of 
copyrights [...] into the digital era". In fact, although DRM and IPR defend the 
same rights, DRM is superior to IPR laws, since it prevents copyright 
infringement and does not bear additional costs (such as litigation costs) 
(RAYNA, 2006a). IPR laws, on the contrary, can only be used after the 
infringement has occurred. 
In terms of durability, DRM allows the firms to control the life span of 
digital files. It is indeed possible to restrict the consumption to a fixed amount 
of time. Although firms do not usually sell "short-lived" digital goods, DRM 
also created the possibility to rent digital goods instead of selling them. 
Without DRM, renting digital goods online is obviously not a feasible option, 
since the consumer would still be able to enjoy the digital good (or a copy of 
this good) even without paying the rent. DRM enables firms to set up a time 
period after which the good will not be playable anymore unless the 
authorisation is, once again, granted. This ability to rent is extremely 
important for firms. Indeed, the main consequence of durability is that it 
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the price equal to marginal cost (COASE, 1972; STOKEY, 1981; BULOW, 
1982, 1986). 
With regard to durability, DRM also allows to make digital goods, which 
are potentially infinitely durable, as obsolete as the hardware which is used 
to play/execute them. Indeed, DRM systems are such that the consumption 
of a protected digital good is authorised on a particular piece of hardware (a 
computer, a portable media player, etc.) that is identified by a unique 
number. If this hardware is replaced by a new one and the digital goods 
stored on the old hardware are transferred by consumers onto the new 
hardware, these a new authorisation will be required in order for the goods 
to be played. Firms are thus able to charge consumers each time they 
change their hardware. As such, DRM prevents digital good from having a 
higher durability than hardware. Since most electronic devices have a life 
expectancy of, at most, three years, DRM systems ensure a constant and 
sustained demand for digital goods instead of a constantly decreasing one, 
as it is the case with durable goods. 
Finally, DRM makes it possible for the firm to use sampling for digital 
goods. First of all, sampling is made possible since firms can set-up a free 
trial period of the digital goods, enough for the consumers to assess the 
value of the goods, after which the consumption is made impossible without 
authorisation (and payment). In addition, DRM enables firms to design fine-
tuned sampling: since DRM requires a formal identification of consumers, a 
per-user sampling system can be designed. This ensures that the trial 
period, the length of which is based on the tastes of each consumer, is long 
enough for the consumer to fully assess the value of the product, but short 
enough to keep the incentive to purchase the product.  
All economic characteristics of digital goods tend to lead to a decrease in 
the demand for legitimate digital goods. Because of its ability to enforce 
excludability and to make renting and sampling practical, DRM allows to 
restore the demand for legitimate digital goods. In addition, since DRM 
enables fine-tuned sampling and expands the marketing options; it is even 
likely that it will in fine lead to an increase of the demand for legitimate digital 
products. 
It is important to note that, although DRM provides firms with important 
advantages, it also has some important limitations. First of all, only a 
minority of digital goods is nowadays protected by DRM, and for any digital 
good protected by DRM, it is still possible to purchase the same digital good 
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The second important limitation, which is linked to the previous one, is 
that all existing DRM systems have been cracked, and patches allowing to 
remove the protection can be downloaded on the internet. Even if that were 
not the case, as long as protected digital goods can be transformed into an 
unprotected format (it is the case with most DRM systems since they allow 
to burn the downloaded protected digital goods on CDs or DVDs) piracy is 
made possible. Ultimately, the rule of thumb is that as long as it is possible 
to see or to hear a digital good, it is possible to copy it (for example, many 
computer programmes are nowadays able to intercept the video and/or 
audio signal sent by the computer to the monitor and/or to the speakers 
when a protected digital good is played, and to create an unprotected file 
from this signal). 
A third shortcoming of DRM is the absence of standard and the 
incompatibilities between DRM systems. This is indeed likely to slow the 
adoption of DRM protected digital goods by consumers, since they are 
aware of the switching costs created by DRM. 
  Digital Right Management and consumers 
From the consumers' point of view, DRM decreases consumer welfare, 
because it enables firms to charge a price above marginal cost. Although 
consumers may anticipate that this short-run loss of welfare may be later 
compensated by an increase of welfare caused by an increase in the quality 
and variety of the goods supplied, the restrictions usually imposed on the 
consumers by the DRM systems make it likely that consumers will avoid, as 
much as possible, consuming protected digital goods. 
First of all, DRM can remove some of the characteristics that are 
normally associated with digital goods. DRM makes protected digital 
products inferior to the non-protected ones, for instance e-books or 
protected audio files cannot be lent and it might be not possible to make a 
backup copy. In addition, as discussed above, DRM systems remove the 
ability to resell digital goods and reduce their universality and durability. 
This is likely to have important consequences, since consumers still have 
a possibility to access digital goods, legally or illegally, that are not protected 
by DRM. For example, Audio-CDs are not protected by DRM. In contrast to 
a protected audio file, the content of a CD can be freely transferred to many 
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lend the CD, to make backup copies of the CD. The good is thus infinitely 
durable and fully universal. Regardless of the new standards and new 
devices being created in the future, the owner of a CD is certain to be 
always able to consume the music recorded on this CD. When the consumer 
is not willing anymore to consume this particular CD, it can be sold on the 
second hand market.  
Likewise, there are important differences between the films protected by 
DRM and the films distributed on DVD-Video. Although DVD-Video cannot, 
theoretically, be copied (widely available software still allows to easily 
bypass the copy protection), they can be lent and resold. Their durability is 
also high, and they can be used on any compatible device. Similar examples 
can be found for most digital goods.  
This lack of features, in comparison to unprotected digital goods, means 
that consumers are unlikely to be willing to pay as much for protected digital 
goods as for unprotected ones. As a matter of fact, protected digital goods 
are often sold at a cheaper price than unprotected ones or than their 
physical equivalents. Nevertheless, in addition to the loss of value created 
by the presence of DRM, digital goods sold online often have additional 
differences to the other digital goods. For example, music and movies sold 
online are heavily compressed, which causes a sharp decrease in quality, as 
opposed to the same good being distributed on a CD of DVD. This means 
that, for consumers, digital goods protected by DRM may have much lower 
value (since they have fewer features and a lower quality) than the 
equivalent unprotected ones. Yet, the difference in price between these two 
types of digital goods is often rather small. 
It could still be argued that protected digital goods bring extra value to the 
consumers because of their fast online access and their low transaction 
cost. Although this is undeniable, consumers also have access to 
unprotected digital goods that have similar features: pirated digital goods. 
These digital goods are also available online for a low transaction cost. In 
addition, they are available for free. Moreover, their determinant feature from 
the consumers' point of view is that they do not have any of the restrictions 
created by DRM. 
Thus, consumers are facing a dilemma. If they want to access digital 
goods online, they can either choose DRM protected files, which are legal, 
but have a low value due to the restrictions of DRM, and a comparatively 
high price or they can download pirated digital goods, which are illegal, but 
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law-abiding consumers are, in a way, "punished": although they do pay for 
their digital goods, the digital goods they obtain have fewer features and 
involve tedious authorisation process. In contrast, consumers who decide to 
pirate obtain full-featured digital goods, for free.  
Another important consequence of the presence of DRM for consumers 
is the absence of secondary market. Indeed, digital goods are, for most of 
them, experience goods: their value is, for consumers, uncertain and only 
becomes known after at least one episode of consumption and, sometimes, 
only after many episodes. The durability of digital goods usually makes up 
for this uncertainty. Since the digital good is durable and can be sold on the 
second-hand market, the consumer is able to recover at least part of his 
initial spending if the good is revealed to be unsatisfactory or not to her 
taste. However, the absence of second hand market removes this possibility 
and increases the potential loss of consumers who are thus expected to be 
even more reluctant to spend money on digital goods that they did not 
experience. Thus, by preventing the existence of secondary market, DRM 
makes the existence of sampling even more critical.  
Unfortunately, in spite of the great potential improvements brought by 
DRM as regards sampling, little has been done, so far, by firms to take 
advantage of this feature. Regardless of the type of digital good, the 
samples offered by the firms are very much like what existed before the 
introduction of DRM. For example, the iTunes Store offers 30 seconds 
sample for music; films samples still rely on trailers/teasers of 30 seconds to 
one minute; software samples are still either limited in time or in terms of 
features. Despite the fact that DRM makes it possible to personalise and 
tailor sampling for each consumer and each type of digital good, the same 
sampling strategy is used for all consumers and all digital goods. 
Since one of the main motivations of consumers for downloading pirated 
digital goods is sampling, chances are that, unless a proper sampling 
strategy is used, consumers will be even more incited to pirate. 
Overall, it is important to note that DRM is expected to increase 
consumer piracy, because of the lack of features of protected files, the 
increased risk brought by the absence of second hand market and the 
insufficient sampling. This is indeed a paradox, since the very goal of DRM 
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  Digital Right Management and society 
With regard to social welfare, although DRM may lead to an 
improvement, it does not completely solve the economic problems caused 
by the nature of digital goods. Indeed, because the marginal cost of digital 
goods is close to zero, so should be their market price in order to achieve 
static efficiency. However, dynamic efficiency requires the price to be above 
marginal cost, as otherwise the initial fixed/sunk costs could not be 
recovered and few, if any, digital goods would be produced. Thus, due to the 
nature of digital goods, it is not possible to actually achieve a total efficiency. 
There is always a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. 
From society's point of view, the challenge raised by DRM is thus quite 
similar to the usual trade-off between static cost and dynamic efficiency that 
applies to any good protected by intellectual property rights. The three 
particular characteristics of digital goods (they are public, durable and 
experience goods) cause the competitive market price for digital goods to be 
extremely low, thereby leading to underprovision of digital goods. By 
allowing firms to fully exclude consumers, reduce the durability of digital 
goods, and enable adequate sampling, DRM permits firms to charge a price 
significantly higher than the marginal cost of producing digital goods. 
Although the positive economic profits are expected to provide firms with 
sufficient incentives to produce digital goods, hence solving the 
underprovision problem, the high price tag of digital goods excludes 
consumers, who would have otherwise found worthwhile purchasing the 
goods, from the consumption of digital goods. Thus DRM may solve the 
problem of underprovision of digital goods, but this comes at a cost: 
underutilisation will appear, and the role of governments is to ensure that the 
level of protection of digital goods is such that the right trade-off between 
these two issues takes place.  
An important problem for governments is the multiplicity and 
incompatibility of DRM systems. DRM has a very low (or non-existent) level 
of interoperability as digital goods protected by a particular DRM system can 
only be decrypted by hardware or software compatible with this DRM 
system. As DRM only allows compatible files to be played by a certain 
technology, it might lead to anti-competitive and even monopolistic 
behaviour. Furthermore, as there is no interoperability between DRM 
technologies, the switching costs are high and consumers are often locked 
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from other industries, where special bodies ensure that established 
standards are not only based on self-interest. 
The issues associated with interoperability, in general, have been of vital 
importance over decades now. Companies constantly release new 
technologies and thus create a need for standards; if not for the common 
protocols and data, it would have been impossible to exchange data, and 
therefore information, using new technologies. One way to achieve 
interoperability is through standards. Standards make coordination and 
cooperation easier as they create similarities between otherwise different 
organisations (BRUNSSON & JACOBSSON, 2002). They can be used as 
"external points of reference" when there is a need to assess the 
performance or quality of a product or a service (LEISS, 1995). Moreover, 
ZHU et al. (2006) discuss the "excess inertia" phenomenon when older 
standards prevent the shift to new standards through creating switching 
costs. The issue of the switching costs introduced by incompatible DRM 
technologies is even more crucial, since switching costs are considered to 
be even more important in networked environments (ARTHUR, 1996; 
SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999; HAX & WILDE II, 1999). Furthermore, switching 
costs are higher when there is no interoperability and consumers need to 
switch between different standards, and lower when consumers switch 
within one standard, therefore consumers are more locked in the same 
product or service when there are several competing standards. 
Interoperability can be increased, and switching costs decreased, if the 
same DRM technology is adopted by several market players. Unfortunately, 
none of the major DRM systems is universal enough to lead to a large 
adoption. There is thus a strong need for a universal DRM technology.  
Several attemps have been made to develop universal DRM systems 
that would make the exchange of content between different DRM platforms 
possible. However, none of these universal systems managed to reach a 
significant market share. 
Thus, besides the question of whether the concept of DRM can improve 
social welfare, it is clear that a minimum requirement for DRM to be socially 
desirable is the existence of a standard and open DRM system. Open and 
universal standards such as the ones developed by the W3C (World Wide 
Web Consortium, organisation in charge of the standardisation of the 
technologies used on the Web), played a determinant role in the 
development, growth, and adoption of the internet. The absence of 
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customers are offered fewer choices in terms of products compatible with a 
certain standard and in terms of payment packages. 
However, even assuming that a universal DRM system existed, the 
positive effects of DRM on society are quite arguable. Indeed, the assumed 
positive effect of DRM lies in its ability to prevent piracy. Nevertheless, 
piracy is always possible as long as non-protected digital goods are 
available. Not only is it still the case nowadays, but it is even likely that it 
always will be. So far, all DRM and anti-copy systems have been cracked 
and consumers have been able to remove the protection from protected 
digital goods. In addition, it takes only one leaked unprotected copy of digital 
good to start a whole stream of piracy. DRM is expected to hinder piracy by 
preventing consumers who purchased digital goods from sharing these 
goods with other consumers. However, as long as other unprotected 
sources are available, it is quite arguable that DRM has any effects on piracy 
at all. In fact, there is currently no empirical proof that the introduction of 
DRM, a few years ago, had any effect on consumer piracy. Quite on the 
contrary, piracy rate has kept increasing. 
The fact that DRM has not made the access to pirated digital goods more 
difficult, means that the pirated digital goods still have, from the consumers' 
point of view, the same value as before the introduction of DRM. In contrast, 
as discussed in the previous section, the restrictions introduced by DRM are 
likely to have reduced the value of legal digital goods. If only these two types 
of digital goods (unprotected/pirated and protected/legal) were available, the 
introduction of DRM would undeniably have decreased social welfare, since 
the situation of pirating consumers would be unchanged, while that of law-
abiding consumers would worsen due to the lower value of digital goods. In 
addition, resources would be used to develop and maintain the DRM 
system. 
However, at the moment, non-DRM-protected digital goods, such as 
Audio-CDs, are still available to consumers. As mentioned above, these 
goods have a greater value than protected digital goods, since they are full-
featured, but are also expected to be sold at a higher price. In this case the 
introduction of DRM is nothing more than a hidden form of versioning. By 
offering DRM-protected digital goods at a lower price than unprotected 
digital goods, firms attempt to capture additional consumer surplus through 
second-degree price discrimination. The goal is to lure the consumers with a 
medium reservation price for digital goods (e.g. consumers who were either 
pirating or not consuming, but, in any case, were not buying legal 
unprotected digital goods), into purchasing digital goods. However, such a 122     No. 69, 1
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strategy is successful in increasing the demand for digital product only if 
consumers with high reservation price (e.g. consumers that were beforehand 
paying for legal unprotected digital goods) are put-off from consuming DRM-
protected digital goods. Hence the restrictions and lower quality introduced. 
DRM protected digital goods are, in fact, "value-substracted versions" 
(SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999). Although second-degree price discrimination 
is not, per se, expected to decrease social welfare, the small number of 
versions offered (three) makes it unlikely to allow for a social welfare 
improvement. Furthermore, the introduction of lower quality digital goods is, 
in the case of DRM, not neutral, since (as it is often the case with information 
technologies) introducing value-substracted versions is actually costly. 
Indeed, the cheaper option for firms would be to distribute full-featured legal 
digital goods. DRM systems are costly to develop and to maintain, especially 
once taken into account the actions of hackers that force DRM systems 
developers to upgrade their systems on a continuous basis. Although value-
subtracted versions may allow firms to obtain higher profits, the cost of 
development and maintenance of DRM systems and the fact that DRM 
leads, at best, to a gross second-degree price discrimination, makes DRM 
systems (at least in the way they are developed and used nowadays) 
wasteful and socially undesirable.  
A final source of concern is that DRM creates privacy issues that have to 
be dealt with. Not only is DRM technology used to collect personal 
information, but also, very often, does it without the knowledge of the parties 
concerned. This characteristic of DRM undermines ethical values and 
expectations of the public. 
  Conclusion 
This article showed that Digital Rights Management is, a priori a very 
interesting concept, since it is supposed to solve at once the three main 
problems associated with digital goods. Indeed, DRM enables firms to fully 
recover their excluding power (thereby making digital goods private), to 
reduce the durability of digital goods and to use sampling (thereby making 
the true value of the good known to consumers). Although DRM theoretically 
provides firms with important advantages, it has, in practice, serious 
limitations. Among them, the fact that many non-protected digital goods are 
available to consumers is certainly a crucial one. This article also 
emphasises that all DRM systems have so far been eventually "cracked" T. RAYNA & L. STRIUKOVA  123 
and that consumers are able to remove the DRM protection. In this respect, 
consumers are shown to have very little incentives to favour DRM protected 
digital goods over non-protected ones. In fact, the restrictions introduced by 
DRM strongly decrease the value of digital goods, making protected digital 
goods very poor competitors in comparison to unprotected digital goods 
(both legal and illegal). 
From a social point of view, it is shown that, although DRM may, in 
theory, permit an efficient provision of digital goods, the absence of 
standards among DRM systems and their incompatibilities are likely to 
decrease social welfare even further. In addition, as long as unprotected 
digital goods are still available, DRM is unlikely to prevent, or even diminish 
piracy. In fact, it is demonstrated that the introduction of DRM is not 
expected to increase social welfare, even in the case when one standard 
system exists. The main effect of the advent of DRM is that it provides firms 
with the ability to price discriminate consumers. However, since this price 
discrimination requires a costly reduction of the quality of digital goods, it is 
obvious that it is expected that DRM systems are wasteful and socially 
undesirable. 
Overall DRM helps companies to strengthen their market position. DRM 
can be a useful tool to create corporate value, however, as any tool it may 
have a destructive power as well. The problematic issues associated with 
DRM, such as anti-competitiveness, privacy, etc. make it very challenging 
for companies and governments to balance corporate and public interests.  
In terms of public policy, it is clear that the establishment of a standard 
and universal DRM system is a minimal requirement. Other social (and 
corporate) improvements could be brought by rethinking Digital Rights 
Management. It is thought that DRM more often stands for Digital 
Restrictions rather than for Digital Rights Management. "R" should stand for 
rights, not for restrictions. Instead of stripping digital goods of their distinctive 
positive features, firms using DRM should instead increase the value of 
protected digital goods. So far, law-abiding consumers are punished for their 
honesty: the digital goods they pay for have fewer features than pirated 
digital goods. Such consumers should, on the contrary be rewarded. It is 
clear when examining the current DRM policies used by the firms that they 
do not use DRM to its full potential, but merely as a way to capture additional 
surplus from honest consumers, who end up paying for pirating consumers. 
DRM is a very powerful tool, and it could enable firms to achieve near-first 
degree price discrimination. But this would certainly require a complete 
rethinking of firms marketing and pricing strategies. 124     No. 69, 1
st Q. 2008 
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